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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1958



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ORGANIZATION, FUNCTION OF WARSAW PACT DESCRIBED

Budapest NEPHADSEREG in Hungarian No 48, 28 Nov 81 p 11

[Article: "Structure of the Warsaw Pact Organization"]

[Text] Sergeant-Major Kalman Pongracz wrote to our editorial office inquiring about the structure of the leading bodies and organs of the Warsaw Pact Organization and about the role of the Committee of Defense Ministers. Since his question is of interest to many of our readers we are replying with the following.


The basic document for the defense organization of European socialist countries was signed on 14 May 1955 in Warsaw. As is well known, the alliance was created to counter the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was established in 1949. Its basic task is to secure peace in Europe; to develop, on the basis of the principles of internationalism, fraternal friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance among the member states, and a reliable collective for the defense of socialist achievements.

The highest organ of our defense community is the PTT (Political Consultative Commission). In general, it meets annually or as necessary, and it has the right of decision in the most important political and military political questions. The first secretaries (secretaries-general) of the communist parties of the member states and the workers' parties, the heads of state, and on occasion the foreign and defense (national defense) ministers participate in its work.

The highest level military organ of the Warsaw Pact Organization is the HMB (Committee of Defense Ministers). The committee was formally established by a March 1969 resolution of the PTT, but in practice the ministers, in bilateral or multilateral form, had also been consulting prior to that time. The HMB meets periodically in various capital cities, and the defense ministers of the member states serve by turns as chairman. The main task of the committee is continuously to follow internal and international events affecting the activities of the organization, exchange experiences gained in the development of the armed forces in the member states, closely coordinate joint activities, and work out proposals serving effective combined defense.

The positions, recommendations and proposals of the HMB are standard in the work of the joint upper leadership organs as they are in the activities of the national military leadership. Decisions are passed by majority vote, but are binding only

The Leading Bodies, Organs and the Organizational Structure of the
Warsaw Pact Organization



Key:

1. Political Consultative Commission
2. Committee of Defense Ministers
3. Committee of Foreign Ministers
4. United Armed Forces Commander
5. Military Council of the United Armed Forces Command
6. United Command
7. National Deputies of the EFEF
8. EFE Chief of Staff, EFEF First Deputy
9. EFEF Deputy of the Air Defense Commander
10. EFEF Armament Deputy
11. EFE Staff
12. Military Scientific-Technical Council
13. National Deputy of the EFE Chief of Staff
14. Deputies of the EFE Chief of Staff
15. EFE Technical Body

on those who join in the yes vote. The earlier consultations of the ministers used to be primarily mutual information forums, but now the committee plays an incomparably greater role in all aspects of the development of military integration. Within the Warsaw Pact Organization the United Armed Forces Command operates as a permanent organ. At the top is the Chief Commander (at present V. Kulikov, marshal of the USSR). The Command is responsible for the practical execution of joint military tasks, oversees the training of the United Armed Forces, the preparation and conduct of joint exercises. The governments of the member countries appoint chief commander deputies from among their own armies. The Hungarian deputy chief commander is General Karoly Csemi, state secretary in the ministry of defense.

The chairman of the EFE (United Armed Forces) Military Council is the chief commander and its members the chief commander deputies. The Military Council has essentially consultative and proposal-making functions. Among other things, it investigates such problems, for example, as the maintenance of the combat readiness and mobilization capability of the United Armed Forces at the constantly desired level, the organizational build-up of the troops, the organization of their training, the long-term plans for quality development, the improvement of troop leadership, the measures for preparing the theaters of operation, and so forth.

The direct operational superior organ of the chief commander is the staff of the United Armed Forces. The chief of staff (at present Army General A. Gribkov), as first deputy of the chief commander, coordinates the activities of the leading organs of the United Armed Forces command.

6691

CSO: 2500/81

DANGERS OF OPPORTUNISM, SECTARIANISM STRESSED

Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian 7 Dec 81 pp 2-3

[Article by Sevo Tarifa, deputy director of the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Studies in the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers Party: "The Class Struggle Is Carried out Properly When Opportunist or Sectarian Deviations Are not Tolerated"]

[Text] In his report to the 8th Congress of the Albanian Workers Party Comrade Enver Hoxha stressed: "To properly carry out the class struggle means to carry it out without tolerating deviations of the right or of the left, opportunistic or sectarian deviations." This teaching has a great theoretical and practical significance.

Opportunism of the Right--The Main Danger

In the body of the proletariat and of its party, opportunism is like a knife with two cutting edges: right and left. The right cutting edge is rightist opportunism, revisionism, which has been and remains the main enemy of our party and of the entire international Marxist-Leninist Communist movement.

One of the outstanding characteristics of our party is its intolerance toward the class enemies and its determined and principled struggle against them. In its 40-year existence it has encountered and vanquished foreign enemies, various imperialists and Titoite, Khrushchevite, Chinese and Eurocommunist revisionists and, from the very beginning, opportunists and factionalists such as Anastas Lulo, Sadik Premte and other enemies who appeared, from time to time, out of its own ranks. In this framework, our party is ready to carry on a bitter class struggle against deviations of the right. This struggle is expressed in two directions: against the opportunistic views and hostile activity of betrayers of the party and against opportunistic manifestations of our people who have been educated and tempered in the class-revolutionary spirit.

Rightist opportunism is the main danger. The causes are varied. Some of the internal causes include: the pressure on the party exerted by remnants of the classes which have been overthrown, which operate not only directly against the dictatorship of the proletariat, although the latter is vigilant and active, but also indirectly, secretly working to prevent the building of socialism in the country; the pressure of old vestiges which exist in the awareness of individuals, who are "invisible enemies", "they do not have teeth but their bite is fatal"; the pressure of new hostile elements who, from time to time, come out of our ranks, who gradually take

anti-socialist positions and become dangerous to society; the petit-bourgeois origin of many communists which leads some of them to falter and to tolerate the class enemy; the inadequate ideological training of a number of communists which often makes them confuse antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions, underestimate the class enemy, relax their vigilance, and slip into positions of rightist opportunism.

The espousal of rightist opportunism is also explained by external causes. The following are the main external causes: imperialist-revisionist political pressures against our country, which are many and varied and have the aim of bringing the Albanian Workers Party to its knees, stifling the only revolutionary voice in Europe, and removing Albania from the path of socialism; the ideological aggression of the capitalist-revisionist world, which, in regard to our country, is widespread and fierce, and which aims at denigrating its socialist reality and debasing our opinions; the economic blockade and the economic and financial crises of the capitalist-revisionist world which also have dangerous results for Albania; the military threats of foreign enemies which aim at frightening our people who do not get frightened, at arousing the phychoses of war, insecurity, pacifism, opportunism and capitulation.

These internal and external manifestations, which make rightist opportunism the main enemy and danger, have an objective nature because they exist independent of our will, awareness and desire. But this does not mean that they are inevitable; it does not mean that the subjective factor, the party, cannot do anything against them. On the contrary, a true Marxist-Leninist party, such as our party, which follows a correct line and struggle to prevent evil, takes action to prevent the birth of revisionism so that the tragedy of the Soviet Union and some other countries, where the revisionists and counterrevolutionaries have come to power, will never occur.

In addition to the struggle which our party has been consistently carrying on against the enemies of Marxism-Leninism, the revolution and socialism, it has carried on and is carrying on an unceasing and fierce struggle against liberalism and bureaucracy, which are grist for the mill of counterrevolution, which are two dangerous enemies and which threaten the dictatorship of the proletariat from within, and, therefore, a determined struggle against them is vital for the fate of socialism.

Sectarianism--Leftist Opportunism

Life shows that the line of our party has never been opportunistic or sectarian. It has always been engaged in a struggle between the two extremes. Some manifestations of opportunism, and of sectarianism, are the result of errors of specific individuals and are a consequence of distortion in the practice of the correct line of the party.

What are the causes of sectarianism and what are some of its bad consequences?

The opportunist makes the enemy his friend while the sectarian goes to the other extreme and makes his friend the enemy and goes so far as to call a party person an enemy. The opportunist does good things for every child of the enemies while the sectarian does bad things to all these children. The two of them do not differentiate. The opportunist indicates that he is ready to admit any element into the Front, even a person who has been condemned for hostile activity while the sectarian does not approve of the admission to this organization of any person even one who could be a member.

However, it is not only persons who make concessions to the enemy who are guilty of opportunism. Persons who make concessions to a comrade or friend whose faults they see but do not criticize also fall into opportunism. The opportunist is meek when he should be harsh. The sectarian is always ready to say that everything should be resolved by administrative measures while the opportunist pardons you when you should not be pardoned. In this case, sentimentality nurtures opportunism. A person who is an opportunist today with a comrade or a friend runs the risk of being an opportunist tomorrow with an enemy. Small mistakes which are not corrected turn into big mistakes.

What are the general reasons why some people fall into sectarianism? They are: narrow and rigid viewpoints which hinder the broad and correct judgment of issues; the arrogance of those who think that they are all-powerful, that they have unlimited rights and can do what they want, even though it conflicts with regulations; the wavering of individuals of petit-bourgeois origin who, when they are criticized for rightist opportunism, go over to the other side, to leftist opportunism.

Sectarianism is damaging. It makes people dissatisfied; it dulls them intellectually; it irritates them; it immobilizes them in their work. When people are not treated tactfully they become dissatisfied. In this way, the sectarian errors of this or that communist or cadre damage the ties of the party with the masses and their unity. Manifestations of sectarianism hinder the activation of cadres and activists because the sectarian is confined to a narrow circle of male comrades and even fewer female comrades, in whom he has little trust. Sectarian concepts hinder the augmenting of the ranks of the party, the rise of new cadres to positions of responsibility, the underestimation of old cadres, the discovery of new forms and methods for the organization of the work, education and mobilization of people.

A Struggle on Two Fronts

The present-day revisionists accuse us of being sectarians because they want us to be opportunists like they are. But we are neither opportunists nor sectarians because both are dangerous. Rightist opportunism leads to revisionism. It is the real main enemy but this does not mean that sectarianism does not present any danger. Sectarianism is the other cutting edge of opportunism, rightist opportunism. Therefore, as the 8th Congress of the AWP said, opportunistic or sectarian deviations "are equally dangerous and have serious consequences for the party, for the unity of the people and for socialist society". In the final analysis, the most dangerous thing is the one which is not combatted. In an organization or collective which struggles only against opportunism but not against sectarianism, the latter can be more dangerous. In a place where only sectarianism is combatted, opportunism thrives and, in this case, it is more dangerous. This means that the disease which is not combatted spreads. Therefore, good work is done when neither one nor the other are forgotten.

Sectarianism is the brother of opportunism. He who is a leftist today is preparing to be a rightist tomorrow. A leftist action today runs the risk of becoming an opportunist action tomorrow. A balance can be achieved only by correctly implementing the party line, properly noting manifestations of sectarianism as well as opportunism.

The secret of the struggle against opportunism and sectarianism lies in the fact that they must not be combatted only when they raise their heads. A continuing preventive work must be carried on so that evils are exposed before opportunistic and sectarian manifestations appear. This requires, at all times, political clear-thinking, ideological maturity, revolutionary sharpness, class education, a militant spirit, sincerity toward the people and a deep hatred of the class enemy. But, our correct and determined attitude in regard to enemies should not lead to sectarianism. As the party teaches us, opportunism is not combatted from positions of sectarianism. The Marxist-Leninist theory of our party is properly put into practice when the fire is not extinguished against one or against the other, because as Comrade Enver Hoxha stressed at the 8th party congress: "Only by carrying out the class struggle correctly and without deviations, with the broad participation of the working masses led by the party will the present always be built correctly and will it rest on sound bases and will the future of the fatherland and of socialism be assured."

CSO: 2100/32

RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE, UNITED STATES, CANADA ASSESSED

Sofia MEZHDUNARODNI OTNOSHENIYA in Bulgarian No 4, 1981 pp 42-47

[Article by Lenko Lenkov: "Relations of Bulgarian People's Republic with Western European Capitalist Countries, the United States and Canada at the Beginning of the 1980's"]

[Text] The Bulgarian People's Republic has met the 1980's with increased international prestige acquired because of the principled basis of our foreign policy--the strengthening of peace and opposition to warmongering aggressive forces, peaceful joint collaboration as equals between states with a different social order.

Consistently conducted on all lines, our country's foreign policy guarantees the sovereign and independent development of present-day Bulgaria on the path towards the further all-round progress of a developed socialist society. This conclusion was affirmed from the rostrum of the Twelfth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The congress reported the successful fulfillment of the foreign policy goals set by the Eleventh Congress and, first and foremost, of the most important goal--the intensification of the alliance with the USSR and other fraternal socialist countries and active promotion of the strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the socialist community. The congress of Bulgarian communists made a thorough class analysis of the international situation and found that despite the open opposition of the enemies of detente collaboration between states with a different social order is developing satisfactorily on the European continent: political contacts at all levels have become more intensive and fruitful of results; the volume and scope of economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations have grown. Thanks to the omnifaceted and energetic activity of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community detente has continued and international security has been fortified despite significant artificial deterioration of the international situation because of actions of the most aggressive circles of imperialism, and especially the United States. The course of confrontation, accompanied by saber-rattling and unconcealed military preparations, shows that the danger of a new war has not been definitively eliminated.

In this situation the Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress updated the peace program, thus giving the peace-loving forces exceptionally favorable opportunities for reenforcement of the peace offensive. The Soviet Union's important foreign policy initiatives in the most urgent world-troubling areas show how the reactionary course of confrontation can be thwarted and new impetus given to detente under conditions of the 1980's.

The Bulgarian Communist Party, viewing these conditions and preconditions creatively and from the standpoint of the scientific approach, has projected the country's new foreign policy course and the lines of its further development, aimed at clearly and realistically attainable goals in the struggle for a widening of political and military detente and for progress of the people and peace-loving humanity. Adapted to the development of present events in the world, the foreign policy course of the Bulgarian People's Republic, affirmed from the rostrum of the congress, is a constructive continuation of the Blagoev-Dimitrov policy and a new creative application of the party's April foreign policy line. This consistency in our foreign policy is, in final analysis, our contribution to the normalization of the international situation, to the creation of an equilibrium of forces in the world such that imperialism cannot dictate the fundamental lines of development. That is why the fundamental tasks now facing our foreign policy continue to be active and constructive cooperation in guaranteeing lasting peace and creating the most favorable foreign policy conditions for the building of socialism and communism in our country and the other fraternal countries, and further affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence. For Bulgarian communists and for our entire people the equal and mutually advantageous collaboration of states with a different social order is the only sensible way to eliminate the danger of a new world war.

The Western European countries, the United States and Canada occupy an important place in Bulgaria's system of political, economic and cultural relations with the developed capitalist states. Our foreign policy towards these countries is directed towards a persistent and consistent surmounting of the natural and artificial barriers in the path to detente under the conditions of the political climate created since the Conference on Security and Cooperation. The real and positive effect of high-level contacts and meetings has created conditions and preconditions for a widening of bilateral relations. Our presence in these countries is becoming more and more active and fruitful of results at the beginning of the present decade. Comrade T. Zhivkov's recent meetings with leaders of the FRG, Portugal and Malta, with the king of Belgium, the chancellor of Austria, with the ministers of foreign affairs of Finland and Spain have been of prime importance for the positive development of Bulgaria's relations with the developed capitalist countries. To be noted especially is Comrade T. Zhivkov's exceptional contribution to a full, successful and constructive scientific exposition of the principles, goals and problems of Bulgaria's foreign policy during national and international events--speeches to the National Council of the Fatherland Front, the 80th anniversary of the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], the World Parliament of Nations for Peace, and at the ceremonial session on the occasion of the 1300th anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian state. As a whole, the energetic foreign policy activity of the country's party and government leader has given a new invigorating impetus to, and raised to a higher level, the development of relations with the aforementioned countries.

Very useful also have been Comrade P. Mladenov's meetings with his colleagues from Austria, Spain, Finland, France, Iceland, Denmark, the FRG etc., at which new demarches for the widening of collaboration with these countries were frankly and logically outlined. It is to be noted that at the present moment a number of meetings of the Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs with ministers of the aforementioned states have been prepared or are in the process of preparation, thus eloquently attesting to the broad scope of the country's foreign political contacts

and indisputably confirming Comrade T. Zhivkov's statement that "in no other period of our history did we maintain so diverse and mutually advantageous contacts with the developed capitalist countries."

From the beginning of 1980 to the present moment the number of our ministers who have visited Western European countries, the United States and Canada, and of their counterparts who have visited our country, exceeds 40. The mutually advantageous and beneficial contacts along this line have been primarily in the promising areas of economic relations, culture, tourism etc.

The exchange of parliamentary delegations is continually expanding. An ever larger number of prominent political, economic and cultural figures from Western countries visit Bulgaria and show lively interest in our peaceful foreign policy, our economic potentialities and rich cultural heritage.

A token of our active peace-loving foreign policy and of our country's increased potentialities and prestige is the national and international forums and meetings that have been held in Bulgaria: the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, the International Detente Dialogue Meeting, the World Parliament of Nations for Peace, the Third International Meeting of Writers, the meeting of ministers of education of European countries, the meeting of ministers of culture, the "Banner of Peace" International Children's Assembly and many others. They have furthered the mutual acquaintance of the participants and the exchange of ideas and have doubtless contributed to the cause of world peace.

A recognized and useful form of political exchange with the capitalist countries is regular consultations between ministries of foreign affairs. These contribute substantially to the clarification of many problems and stimulate the development of bilateral relations. In our relations with some countries these consultations are at present the most recognized and acceptable form of official exchange.

Exchanges with the capitalist countries by way of political parties, social, trade-union, youth, sports and other organizations also have a definite place in the conduct of our foreign policy. The results in this area are encouraging and concretely attest to the political prestige of our country, which more and more is winning recognition as a sought-after, desired and esteemed partner.

An important trend in our country's activity in broadening economic, scientific and technical relations with other states is the rational utilization of the potentialities of the international division of labor. Naturally, the center of our attention has been and continues to be collaboration with the countries of the socialist community. But at the same time our country desires the establishment of stable and mutually advantageous economic relations with the developed capitalist countries and the broadening thereof subject to strict observance of mutual obligations. The constructive principled approach of our party and government to economic collaboration with these countries confirms the peace-loving character of our foreign policy in international economic relations as well. On the other hand, the rapid development of the present-day material and technical base has become a precondition for the continuous qualitative improvement and activation of Bulgaria's foreign economic

relations, including those with the Western European countries, the United States and Canada. The program of the Twelfth BCP Congress has created an objective foundation for new dynamic prospects in our foreign economic relations.

At the beginning of the new decade our commerce with the countries of Western Europe, the United States and Canada exceeds 2.6 billion foreign-exchange leva. The structure of our exports to these countries, which valuewise exceed imports, is constantly improving. A wide basis in treaty law for the development of economic exchange with a large part of the European capitalist countries has been constructed and is being improved. New forms are coming into practice: industrial cooperation, the setting up of mixed enterprises, of projects in third countries etc. etc.

Our country firmly stands by its policy directed towards the overcoming of discriminatory restrictions and the improvement of the commercial and political conditions of our economic relations with the capitalist market. At the same time the United States still holds back from granting us the most-favored-nation clause for overtly political reasons. The adoption of a politically realistic position by the U.S. Congress and the granting of the clause without advance conditions would create the preconditions for the expansion of Bulgarian-American economic relations and for their normal development on a mutually advantageous and equal basis. Nor do we meet with an adequate expression of political good will on the part of the European Economic Community. Displaying patience, constructiveness and initiative, our country, as a participant in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, calls for the materialization of tangibly created conditions for vigorous and mutually advantageous economic collaboration between CEMA and EEC and between the countries of these communities.

The overcoming of discriminatory barriers, the growth of balanced trade, the rise in the efficiency of our exports, and the further development of new forms of economic exchange are the basic directions to be taken for the development of Bulgaria's foreign economic relations in the years ahead, which, seen against the results already achieved, conclusively attests to the correct and successful foreign economic policy towards the Western countries.

Our international relations in the area of cultural collaboration are constructed on the principle of peaceful coexistence, too. Our socialist culture makes its contribution to the struggle for peace and detente, for social progress and the spiritual flowering of humanity. The preconditions for this are the thousand-year history of our country, an artistic potential tremendous in its scale, and the high achievements of our present-day culture and art. Since the signing of the Final Act at Helsinki the Bulgarian international cultural policy has increasingly been more closely linked with our consistent peace policy and subordinated to the long-term and immediate goals of the Bulgarian state in the international arena. The Twelfth BCP Congress assigned to cultural policy the tasks of popularizing the progress of real socialism and the rich history of the Bulgarian people, of promoting the better acquaintance of people, of strengthening the confidence between countries, and of being an important means of mobilization in the struggle for peace.

Bulgarian socialist culture and art continue indisputably to win international recognition. The "Thracian Art," "Bulgarian Medieval Civilization" and other exhibitions

in Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, France etc. have had tremendous success. The practice of organizing Bulgarian film, music and theater weeks has been gaining ground and a more comprehensive picture of Bulgarian culture is thus formed in the individual countries. Representatives of the Bulgarian People's Republic take an active part in international cultural events organized by the Western countries and win prestigious prizes. Creative contacts are being actively developed between writers, critics, theater lovers etc. Our country is world famous as the initiator and organizer of international competitions, festivals, meetings etc., for welcoming exhibitions, theatrical casts, troupes of artists etc., and for opening wide its doors to real and genuine values created by human genius and to cultural collaboration on behalf of peace and progress.

The celebration of the 1300th anniversary of the Bulgarian state opened up new, still greater and more lasting opportunities for carrying on large-scale comprehensive activities and for the mutual exchange of cultural values with these countries. In prospect is the realization of unique ideas, programs and events, which will have a long-term effect and be an original contribution to international cultural collaboration.

One of the fundamental tasks of our foreign policy that is taking on increasingly greater significance and timeliness is the fashioning of a broad basis in treaty law for bilateral relations with the developed capitalist countries of Western Europe, the United States and Canada. Agreements in various areas outline the directions and prospects for long-term stable development of relations with these countries on principles of peaceful coexistence. They have as their aim that the most favorable foreign political and foreign economic conditions and preconditions should be secured for building a developed socialist society in our country. At the beginning of 1981 the Bulgarian People's Republic had over 150 agreements, entered into and in effect, with these countries. The number of draft agreements presented or in process of consideration and coordination is large. Experience shows that the work involved in building, expanding and updating the treaty basis of Bulgaria's relations with the developed capitalist countries is complex. The difficulties stem primarily from the fact that, owing to their political, economic and narrowly class interests, our partners exhibit restraint and reserve. All the treaties, agreements, protocols and other official documents signed between the Bulgarian People's Republic and individual Western countries are the fruit of our country's initiative and persistent work.

An important element in our foreign policy as well is the strengthening of security and collaboration in Europe and the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. An eager participant from the very beginning of the process, the Bulgarian People's Republic is actively approaching the preparation and conduct of the Madrid meeting. Our country is for the formulation of a balanced final document of the meeting as regards all sections of the Final Act. The Madrid meeting would make an especially valuable contribution if the difficulties and unconstructive position of certain Western countries were overcome and a decision taken to convene an all-European conference for military detente and disarmament.

Combining a creatively multilateral diplomacy and a bilateral approach, the Bulgarian People's Republic continues to improve qualitatively the geographic thrust of our foreign policy. Our relations with the Federal Republic of Germany are now

growing and expanding. A common desire exists to seize the opportunities for a dynamic, long-term and lasting collaboration.

Our relations with France and Italy are developing well. The basis for this is the growing objective opportunities and the mutual interests of our nations. The development of our relations with these countries, however, still lags behind the real opportunities.

Bilateral Bulgarian-Austrian relations encompass almost all areas. Their upward trend is welcomed by both sides. The frank, constructive and useful dialogue, held recently by the chairman of the State Council, Comrade Todor Zhivkov, with Austrian chancellor, Dr Bruno Kreisky, not only regarding bilateral economic and other questions but also regarding urgent international problems, is a good example of relations between two states with a different social order.

There is also progress and good prospects in the development of our economic, political and cultural relations with Holland, Belgium, Spain and Switzerland. Our collaboration with Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Iceland is also developing well.

A certain expansion of economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations with the United States, Great Britain and Canada has been achieved. Our country has repeatedly expressed its readiness to create a solid foundation and political relations with these countries.

The forecasts say that the 1980's will not be easy. The most important task facing mankind is the protection of peace, equal collaboration and mutual respect. The surest and most effective way of solving the burning and urgent problems of present-day international life is not military force, but constructive dialogue and negotiations. The Bulgarian People's Republic is fully resolved to make its contribution to the achievement of real results in peaceful coexistence and the protection of peace.

6474

CSO: 2200/34

PARTY WEEKLY DISCUSSES DEVIATION FROM DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

Belgrade KOMUNIST in Serbo-Croatian 30 Oct 81 pp 9,10

[Article by Zivorad Djordjevic: "The Principle Is Clear--the Deviation Is in Application"]

[Text] Democratic centralism is again becoming the center of discussions in the League of Communists. This is not just a question of the usual pre-congress discussion about one of the themes from party life. It could rather be asserted that the main reason for this discussion was deviation from this principle in the practice of the League of Communists, and inconsistent application of it. All of us, more or less, want a united LCY, and we also want democratic centralism, but we are also striving for autarchy and independence of individual parts of the LCY (which are hard to identify with the efforts for democratization); this is seriously contradicting our above-mentioned verbal commitments. Thus the attempts in practice to disrupt the unity of the LCY and to violate on this basis the principle of democratic centralism make it necessary for a thorough discussion to take place, before the 12th LCY Congress, the republican congresses, and the provincial conferences, not about democratic centralism as a principle, but primarily about the application and observance of this principle.

In the ideological and political-normative sense, the documents and commitments of the LCY do not leave anything open to question in defining the need for democratic centralism and its essence. The LCY Statute is very clear: democratic centralism is the basic principle for the internal life, organization and activity of the LCY and all of its members, organizations, forums, and organs; this principle makes possible the united and disciplined implementation of a democratically adopted policy.

What Is Really New

Even such clear commitments, however, are more and more frequently being disputed, and attempts are being made to have something that is unambiguous covered with a veil of a suspicion of ambiguity, and, in the name of the "need to respond to the demands of the time," to change the basis for the unity of the LCY, and thus also the cohesion and stability of all of Yugoslav society.

Some authors are raising the following questions: what type of unity is suitable for the LCY--one based on classical democratic centralism, which imposes strong obligations, or one based on democratic agreement? There are also some theoreticians

who openly reject democratic centralism, considering it an obsolete and outgrown LCY principle. They say that Lenin's party is not the same thing as the present-day LCY (which is correct), but in saying this they are forgetting that "not being the same" is not being "absolutely different"; in democratic centralism they see only a bureaucratic concept of centralism, but they do not see its significant democratic component--the participation of the membership in constructing a policy; and they therefore conclude that democratic centralism is the "immanent over-emphasized role of the leading organs." They want to be authentic Marxists who start from practice, but they behave like scholastics who cannot perceive their own time because of their excessively strong prejudices.

Many "affairs" are obviously mingled together here. We want unity, unity based on self-managing agreement; and this is in order. But we really do not want a democratic centralism that imposes obligation. This means that we will arrive at unity through democratic agreement, but what will oblige us to observe and carry out our agreements in order for us to preserve our unity? The critics of democratic centralism are left without an answer to this. Experience teaches us that because of our nonobservance of agreements, in short because of our irresponsibility, we have seriously threatened not only the unity of the LCY but also the unity of society as a whole. By rejecting the "obligatory" element in democratic centralism, we in fact are not only rejecting this principle as such, but are rather turning the LCY into a debating tribunal, with the validity of democratically adopted decisions ending with the conclusion of the debate. Thus, the obligatory discipline of the members and organizations in carrying out the policy agreed upon, as a constituent part of democratic centralism, within the complex Yugoslav community, is not transitional in nature and cannot be replaced or eliminated. Conscious discipline is also significant today, and it will be 50 years from now just as much as it was 50 years ago. This also applies to democratic centralism as a dialectical union of the democratic participation of the membership in the formation of policy and conscious discipline. It is another question that the critics of democratic centralism, at the very mention of the term "centralism," grab their pockets in order to pull out all possible spiritual and political weapons, and that they obviously do not want to realize that not every centralism is always undemocratic, as well as that not every decentralization is always democratic. If a "centralist" decision is reached in a very democratic manner, and if such a decision preserves unity, can it be denounced as undemocratic?

The critics of democratic centralism are trying to show that "democratic agreement" and "obligatory discipline" are mutually exclusive and that the second should be replaced by the first, thus eliminating the principle of democratic centralism. However, just as violating the right and opportunity of every member to participate in creating policy would reduce the LCY to a bureaucratic organization, neglecting obligatory discipline in carrying out a democratically agreed upon policy would likewise turn it into an ordinary discussion club.

Advocating a consistent application of democratic centralism does not at all challenge or exclude the need to strengthen democracy within the LCY by full mobilization of the membership in creating policy. This really is a constituent part of democratic centralism, and this is what must be continually strengthened in the LCY, and what gives new features to democratic centralism. This innovation in democratic centralism--the democratic method of formulating party policy and decisionmaking--is entailed by democratic centralism as we have defined it. This

is why the meaning of the struggle by the LCY to modernize democratic centralism, to adapt it to the needs of the time, is in expanding the actual participation of the membership in formulating party policy, in redistributing power between the leadership and the membership, and not in abolishing the principle because it entails obligatory discipline which supposedly threatens the freedom of agreement.

The Roots of Arbitrariness

The challenges to democratic centralism are least of all abstract ideological or theoretical constructions. Furthermore, the verbal challenges are marginal in contrast to arbitrariness in practice in the application of democratic centralism. Thus the roots of the challenges are precisely in the everyday life of the LCY. There are many of them, but we will mention two basic ones: a weakening of unity and cooperation, disruption of what links us, and a strengthening of what divides us; and a neglect of responsibility, in fact, an opportunistic toleration of irresponsibility. The roots are thus in practice, and the actual ideological resistance of a dogmatic-bureaucratic and anarcholiberalist nature to democratic centralism is only a spiritual manifestation of the actual relationships within the LCY and society as a whole.

The increasingly more pronounced tendencies toward regional separation into republican, provincial, and commune areas are also having a serious effect on possible appearances of autarchic behavior by individuals parts of the LCY. The intense discussions conducted during the 1970s about whether the LCY is a united organization or a federation of republican and provincial organizations did not then have purely theoretical features, but rather, in fact, were a reflection of division and danger to Yugoslav unity. This dilemma is not being openly posed today, but an attempt is being made to push through a point of view that we have outgrown the principle of democratic centralism. In fact, as in the 1970s, it expresses our division and separation by republican, provincial, and commune borders.

If the republican, provincial, or commune organizations (or to put it more precisely, their leaderships) serve primarily to achieve the national or regional interests of their areas (and unfortunately, it happens that this is not always a question of nationalism, but rather of the partial interests of the leaderships and bureaucratized groups and individuals in them), then the application of democratic centralism threatens such a distorted role for the party organizations and their leaderships. Thus if the LC, instead of struggling to achieve the interests of the working class, gives primacy to regional, partial, and autarchic interests, then it itself serves to divide and break up our unity and cooperation; and then it is pointless to speak about being consistent in the application of democratic centralism, because democratic centralism imposes an obligation of unity and consistency, while autarchy and partialization are a deviation from this.

Practical experience increasingly assures us that in spite of the economic disunity and nonfunctioning of the united Yugoslav market, more and more, under the guise of pluralism of self-managing interests, all possible territorial specific features are being glorified to the point of absurdity, while for the most part what divides us is being stressed, and what links us is being neglected. Furthermore, we are frequently witnesses of attempts to have every reference to Yugoslav cooperation and unity declared unitarianism. They are deliberately ignoring the notorious facts

that togetherness and unity are not the same thing as unitarianism, but also the fact that our delegate system, and the entire self-managing socialist system and method of policy formulation in the federation, in practice make unitarianism essentially impossible as a widespread practice, not only for a single nation, but also for groups and individuals on the level of society overall. The truth is that such attempts are possible, but have no prospects of being accepted or disseminated. All of the delegate bodies and the leaderships of sociopolitical organizations in the federation are elected on an equal basis. It is obvious that such bodies, by definition, cannot conduct a unitarianist policy. All of this basically undercuts the roots of unitarianism as a mass ideological orientation. Without underestimating the danger from the frustrated ambitions of individuals and groups for indulging in unitarianism, and without denying the necessity of struggling against unitarianism as a social relationship, it should nevertheless be said that the necessary struggle of the LCY against separation and nationalism and for unity and cooperation should not always be challenged with warnings of "beware of unitarianism!"

The opportunistic toleration of irresponsibility is another great source of attempts to bypass democratic centralism. In fact, even not carrying out decisions, i.e., violations of democratic centralism, is irresponsibility. The spread of irresponsibility in society, however, damages the fabric of the LC, like any other infection, and exerts an influence on the violation of democratic centralism. Here we are obviously mixing concepts with intentions. If we refer to the need to observe the laws--legal, political, moral, in a word, social norms--it is almost as though an alarm were raised and warnings were issued about the danger from administration and bureaucratization, and the danger to self-management, while the fact is forgotten that self-managing socialist society is an organized society, the social relationships in which, and life in which, are subordinated to social rules of behavior. legal and political norms, and that not adhering to these rules leads to the disintegration of society. On the other hand, it is forgotten that referring to responsibility is not only within the jurisdiction of the state. The socialist self-managing system is planned in just such a way as to have social control, in the broadest sense of the word, exercised by the working class organized through self-management, so that the functioning of responsibility does not mean the activity of the specter of the bureaucratic mechanism of the government.

But tolerating irresponsibility and applying democratic centralism are mutually exclusive. The application of democratic centralism in any form whatsoever does not suit an irresponsible person or someone who tolerates irresponsibility, because it would disrupt the autocracy and anarchic behavior of the first, and the opportunistic tranquility of the second. Thus, while we play with the application of democratic centralism, we will also have irresponsibility, and conversely, while we tolerate irresponsibility, democratic centralism remains in the background.

Survival Through Application [of Democratic Centralism]

As long as the cohesion of Yugoslav society must be ensured through the unity of the LCY, the application of democratic centralism remains a necessity. The need for democratic centralism originates in the LCY's responsibility to the working class and the working people. It is difficult to conceive of achieving the interests of the working class in a complex multinational community without implementation of those principles which are a condition for the normal functioning of an organized society.

We must, in fact, ask whether the Yugoslav community can exist without some guarantee that will make possible the achievement of a minimum of unity, cohesion, organization and responsibility. In other words, the question is what factor will coordinate the federal structure of Yugoslavia, which is based on the statehood of the republics, with the need for the unity of Yugoslavia, and which will democratically and authoritatively overcome these differences, at certain times of disagreement that can threaten necessary unity, and even survival. It is obvious, we will say, that this factor is the LCY and its united ideology; but we can see that in spite of the united ideology, we differ, not in ideology, but in expressing the different interests of republican, provincial, and even commune etatist structures. Thus, without the consistent application of democratic centralism, the achievement of what is in the general interest of the working class is threatened. It is worthwhile to recall Veljko Vlahovic's timely warning that "abandoning the principle of democratic centralism in the LCY would mean its breakdown into various factions guided by different interests and concepts, which originate primarily from the contradictions of socialist development. In fact, this would represent a liquidation of the League of Communists, and thus also an abandonment of socialist social development to uncontrolled natural processes."

9909

CSO: 280/111

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA LC DISCUSSES OPSTINA STATUS

Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 27 Nov 81 pp 3-4

[Summary of the address by Sabrija Pojskic, executive secretary of the Presidium of the LCBH Central Committee, and of the subsequent discussion: "Strong Affirmation of the Opstina as a Self-Managing Association"]

[Excerpts] After emphasizing that it is in the opstina, as the basic sociopolitical community, that the numerous needs and interests of the working people and citizens and of their self-managing organizations and communities are expressed, reconciled with one another and realized in practice, that they exercise their rights and discharge their obligations on an everyday basis, and that it is here that the work and life of the working people and citizens take their most concrete form, Sabrija Pojskic said that it clearly follows from this that achieving the constitutional position of the opstina is an extremely important and large question of political ideology. After all, the further strengthening of the position of associated labor and of the workingman within it and (in society depends to a considerable degree on the consistent self-management transformation of the opstina on the foundations of the constitution, just as the self-management transformation of the opstina depends objectively on a constant strengthening of the position of associated labor.

Experience has shown, and the working group came to that conclusion in preparing this meeting, that overall relations in the opstina develop as a function of the development of the relations of socialist self-management, especially in basic organizations of associated labor and local communities and as a function of the effective operation of the institutions of the political system.

The shortcomings and sometimes lags in development of the relations of socialist self-management which have been manifested even as group-ownership behavior and practice, with a more or less pronounced narrow, partial and local interest, Pojskic said, with rather pronounced tendencies of representative decisionmaking rather than decisionmaking based on delegacy, as well as the practice of reaching agreements on the vital issues and interests within narrow groups and narrow confines, so that the decisionmaking by the working people and citizens is sometimes reduced to a formality thereby, constitute a serious obstacle to more decisive breakthroughs in building up the constitutional position of the opstina, and clearly demonstrate that the tendencies toward bureaucratic-technocratic behavior do exist.

We can say today that a sizable number of organizations of the League of Communists, primary organizations above all, as well as certain organs of the League of Communists, still have not equipped themselves adequately for effective conduct of ideological-political activity aimed at building up the opstina as a self-managing community of working people and citizens. It is a fact that certain members and primary organizations of the League of Communists have not become fully aware of the responsibility they themselves bear for resolving all the overall issues in the opstina through the process of mutual linkage and interdependence of self-managing organizations and communities. The reasons for this situation and these relations should be sought in the manifest tendencies toward confinement into "one's own" organization and self-managing community. Regardless of the motives that lead to confinement, this objectively impedes, and sometimes even prevents, the interests of the working people in the opstina, which at times are quite important, from being reconciled and jointly resolved through the decisionmaking of the workers themselves. Primary organizations of the League of Communists are not discharging one of their basic obligations in such cases, which is, together with the working people and citizens, in conformity with real capabilities and in the concrete socioeconomic conditions, to stimulate and contribute to development of those processes which ensure effective resolution of all issues of common interest to the working people and citizens and thereby of each individual interest.

Promoting the Process of Decisionmaking on the Basis of Delegacy

All the problems and difficulties are manifested most vividly in the activity of opstina assemblies, especially the shortcomings which are manifested in organizations of associated labor and local communities, whether they be a consequence of improper organization, or, much more frequently, the result of slowness in development of the socioeconomic relations of socialist self-management. It is here that we should look first for the basic reasons why more full-fledged processes of reconciliation and resolution of all the interests of the working people and citizens, of organizations of associated labor and of local communities are still not being created in opstina assemblies. Among other things, this naturally has the result that the opstina assembly manifests itself considerably more as a body of government, and incomparably less as a body of self-management in which the interests of self-managing organizations and communities are reconciled through a democratic contest of opinions and decisionmaking procedure based on delegacy. The result is that on the one hand executive and administrative organs, and indirectly, through delegates who often are not tied to the delegate base, even by the specialized staff services of organizations of associated labor, exert a large influence on decisionmaking in opstina assemblies, while on the other hand decisions concerning major social issues are made without sufficient participation of the working people and citizens in the decision-making process. There is a danger in this that the working people and citizens will become passive in the decisionmaking process, that is, that they will not be sufficiently involved in the overall flows of delegate decisionmaking concerning common interests.

It is obvious that institutional creation of organizations of associated labor, of local communities and of the other institutions of the political system is not in and of itself enough for the constitutional conception of the opstina to

be realized effectively. Our experience already allows us on the basis of critical assessments and the experience gained to find opportunities for practical solutions which will contribute to more successful functioning of the institutions of the political system in conformity with the delegacy principle of decisionmaking. One of the things made necessary thereby is that the conditions and opportunities for advancement of the process of decisionmaking by the working people and citizens through delegates and the scope and content of opstina assembly proceedings be subjected to more detailed critical assessment and examination. Certain forms of practical behavior, however, indicate that opstina assemblies are having a fair amount of difficulty in divesting themselves of the operating procedures and subject matter which are typical of the system of representation, and the result is that the old relations and content are retained to a considerable extent within the new institutions....

It is often said in discussions of the development of the delegate system that the delegations are overburdened with material, that they are not sufficiently tied to their constituency, and so on, which is true, Pojskic went on to say. However, the priority issue concerning the functioning of the delegate system is why the delegate's constituency is still expressing its interests and needs insufficiently. When there is not the necessary initiative of the delegate base in this direction, neither the delegation nor the delegate is able to raise particular issues in delegate assemblies. The reasons for this, it seems, should be sought in the fact that the working people, because of the insufficient development of self-management relations within their basic organization of associated labor and local community, are not yet able to examine their interests and needs over the long run and to commit themselves on that basis to ascertaining their common interests and needs.

The LC's Extremely Important Role

However, it is a fact that in the practical realization of this process there is still not enough awareness of mutual interests, of differences, and of the manner of and opportunities for their reconciliation. Practice is still predominantly oriented toward self-interest and to a lesser extent toward seeking and finding solutions of common interest through discussion and agreement. It is here that we should seek the principal causes of the slower pooling of labor and capital on the basis of income sharing and the lack of success in implanting the principle of free exchange of labor. The possibility for the movement of social income in line with broader social interests is often confined for all practical purposes at the level of the opstina. LC organs and organizations in the opstina objectively contribute to this as well, not through their decisions and the stands they take, but by the fact that they do not fight vigorously enough against that practice and behavior.

The differing nature of interest is a reality that must be taken for granted. Only through the organized effort of the League of Communists and the other subjective forces within the institutions of the political system is it possible to overcome those differences and interests, and that precisely on behalf of more effective realization both of each individual interest and also of the general and common interest. It must be constantly born in mind that the shortcomings in, say, one organization of associated labor, are inevitably generating

difficulties and problems to a greater or lesser degree in a number of other organizations within the opstina as a whole. That is why the need to reconcile all interests always emerges as the individual interest of each organization and community. Unfortunately, this is often forgotten in the activity of a number of organizations of the League of Communists.

Overcoming the Old Practice More Decisively

There is a need to overcome more decisively the practice whereby the activity of the primary organizations of the League of Communists is mostly exhausted by the taking of stands, while the concrete monitoring and guidance of the activity of party members in the institutions of the political system to implement them is neglected. That is why it is no accident that the activity of communists often goes no further than the organizational forms of the activity of the League of Communists, while at the same time there is a lack of broader activity in the bodies of self-management, in delegations, in sociopolitical organizations, and especially in the Socialist Alliance.

The successful effort and strengthening of the role of the opstina conference of the League of Communists are inseparable from its constant linkage with and reliance on the initiatives of the rank and file and of basic organizations of the League of Communists. Along that line it is especially important to ensure within the opstina organization of the League of Communists that the rank and file of the League of Communists, on the principles of democratic centralism, enjoy maximum participation in formulating positions, which thus will strengthen responsibility for implementing them through the institutions of the political system. Wherever the rank and file of the League of Communists are still participating little in formulating views in the opstina organization of the League of Communists, those positions are also being implemented incompletely, committees and conferences are operating in a top-heavy fashion more than is necessary, there is not enough close linkage among basic organizations of the League of Communists, committees and conferences, nor are they sufficiently open to the initiatives and opinions of the working people and citizens.

[Discussion]

Alija Latic had this to say, among other things:

"The adaptation of certain organizational arrangements within the institutions of the political system in the opstina is also a precondition for fuller exercise of the right and discharge of the obligation to conduct a broader effort based on independent initiative. Let us recall, for example, that 122 local communities have more than 5,000 inhabitants (some even more than 10,000), that approximately the same number of local communities have between 4,000 and 5,000 inhabitants, which means that in size of population more than 200 local communities are larger than the smallest opstinas in the republic, and then that a considerable number of opstinas are also rather large in both area and population, and that there are still OOUR's [basic organization of associated labor] with a large work force. It is not difficult to conclude that under such conditions it is objectively difficult for the working people and citizens to display broader and more direct initiative in the process of self-management decisionmaking and

perform still more effectively the functions of the political system in the opstina."

This kind of internal organization of the opstina and of the institutions within it, in Latic's words, also objectively limits the effective effort of the League of Communists and the other organized socialist forces. In certain of the larger opstina organizations there are even more than 30,000 members of the League of Communists and as many as 750 primary organizations of the LC. This makes it more difficult for the opstina leadership to have firm everyday links with the primary organizations and to strengthen unity in political ideology and in action of the opstina organization of the LC and for members of the LC to act more fully as principals in formulating and implementing policy.

Making Executive Organs More Accountable

Participating in the debate in yesterday's meeting of the LCBH Central Committee, Milan Skoro spoke among other things about the abnormalities and oversights in opstinas as the basic sociopolitical communities, emphasizing among other things that often the working people and citizens are dissatisfied with technocratic and other behavior displayed in the bodies of government. In the communes, Skoro said, there are things which are not and cannot be accepted from the standpoint of the League of Communists as the vanguard of the working class. There are, for example, a tendency, and this, as he put it, is very dangerous to the future development of the system of communes and the broader sociopolitical communities, for the commune to represent itself as a federation of local communities. This is contrary to the nature of the commune.

"The local community," Milan Skoro said, "cannot assume the functions of a sociopolitical community. That is not its constitutional function, nor does the practice of socialist self-management make this necessary."

He advocated that in the coming period, through the organized effort of the League of Communists and all the other social structures, that there be a reassessment of certain elements of the system in order to evaluate how we are doing in developing an opstina in which the working people and citizens are to realize their most direct interests and needs. The opstinas differ greatly from one another in area, in population and in level of economic development.... Certainly this should be borne in mind during the conversations and concrete implementation of agreements among people to create urban communities.

Presidiums as Working Bodies

Raif Dizdarevic said in the discussion that the question of strengthening work and responsibility and of introducing the 1-year term of office in opstina assemblies is a very urgent one. This stands immediately in front of us. If it is the conception that we will achieve what we want through the initiative to strengthen collective work and to introduce the 1-year term of office merely by the fact that every year we will change the individuals holding the positions of the presidents of the opstina assembly and of the chambers, but without an ongoing activity on the part of the subjective factor, which will ensure the further development and strengthening of the delegate system in the commune, then

there are real dangers of our not achieving this historical step in development of the political system of socialist self-management democracy which we intended and do intend to achieve by strengthening collective work and by introducing the 1-year term of office. Dizdarevic expressed the fear that we might go from one extreme to the other. At present we have had the very evident extreme that the presidents of opstina assemblies have often remained for a long time in their posts. Often the objective situation has brought that about. People did what the objective situation demanded and what it led them to do. "But I am afraid that now we might go to the other extreme, to the situation where in the course of a year of performing a function people will simply pass in transit through that office." We need to ensure, Raif Dizdarevic said, that during the next term of office, over the next 4 years, the delegate assembly develop further in the spirit of delegacy, that its role and its work become stronger, that all delegations be committed more fully, and that means that all the working people and citizens become more involved in the spirit of self-management. If we fail to organize ourselves for this and if we do not consciously keep a watch on it, we could find that the power of the executive bodies of administration and specialized staff services is dominant in the communes, and that would represent a real danger of our coming to a halt in development of the delegate system in opstinas.

One of the possible solutions, in the opinion of Raif Dizdarevic, would be to form the presidiums of opstina assemblies as working bodies rather than as organs of assemblies, and that working bodies which would be made up of delegates for a term of office coinciding with the term of office of the assembly and oriented above all toward preparing what the chambers of the assembly and the assembly as a whole needs for adoption of programs, which would be followed by its concern for implementation of the programs of the assembly as a whole, for ensuring the necessary coordination of efforts within the assembly, and then for the necessary coordination of the work of the assembly with assemblies of self-managing communities of interest. Of course, when we speak about the work of the assembly, about coordination, and so on, it is above all the assemblies and delegations we are talking about. Then their power might also extend over ensuring continuous accountability to the delegate assembly, to all delegations and to all the self-managers of all organs and holders of office elected and appointed by the delegate assembly and accountable to the delegate assembly under the constitution and law. This presidium as a working body, in the opinion of Raif Dizdarevic, would be a factor that would contribute to strengthening collective work of the delegates in assemblies as a whole and in delegations in opstinas as a whole. Certain other arrangements, he said, are also possible, but unless in supplementing the opstina charter we provide some mechanism which will guarantee this kind of development of the delegate system in the commune, with respect to the work of the opstina assembly there is a real fear and danger that the influence and power of executive organs, administrative agencies, and specialized staff services could predominate, while the work of the delegate assembly and of the delegation could die out, and that would be a long step backward.

Raif Dizdarevic spoke in particular about operating procedures in assemblies in general. There is something that exists in the republic and also exists in the opstinas--confinement of bodies solely to themselves and confinement of those who have been elected to bodies primarily to the work of those bodies, within

those bodies and between bodies. There is not enough direct involvement of party members among citizens and workers in all the organs of the assembly. This should be corrected, Dizdarevic said.

What Do the Demands for New Opstinas Bring With Them?

In his speech Milanko Renovica paid particular attention to the questions of the transformation of the opstinas in a geographic sense. Since this is a very complex set of problems, a very careful approach should be taken to all initiatives for a change, but this does not mean any delay whatsoever. These initiatives must be the result of sound analytical work if the criteria or elements for shaping the opstinas are to be at all uniform.

In other words, this means that in forming the opstinas consideration should be given to all the elements so that the working people in such a community might exercise their basic constitutional rights and discharge their duties as in the basic sociopolitical communities, and so that they might realize their overall interests in a basic geographic and functionally linked socialist self-managing community.

This, as Milanko Renovica put it, necessitates verification of two parallel tendencies which differ, however, in their intensity. First, the creation of new opstinas, as a rule smaller ones, and second, for a time there has existed a rather disguised tendency, a tendency undeveloped and unaffirmed, and that is the creation of larger and stronger opstinas. This latter tendency, he said, is slacking off. Those behind it were the organs in the opstinas and those outside the opstinas. It has been almost displaced, weakened and neutralized by the policy of the uniform development of a republic whose backbone would be the opstina. The opstina is that socioeconomic framework in which the policy of socioeconomic development is to be set forth and carried out. Accordingly, what happened in practice was that those places which had been underdeveloped and which continued to be opstinas had a far greater and more intensive development than those places which had been urban or certain other agglomerations and had a certain tradition, including an industrial tradition, and where for various reasons those opstinas were abolished or merged--their economic, social and other functions were crippled, their development was crippled, and this is now encouraging the initiative to create new opstinas.

That means that this former tendency, this practice of creating new opstinas, should truly undergo a definite sociopolitical verification to see what concrete form it might take in the context of our present development.

7045

CSO: 2800/123

ARGUMENT OVER 'KARDELJIZATION' OF SYSTEM REJECTED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1610, 8 Nov 81
pp 22-23

[Reaction of Branko Vukusic to an article by M. Kesetovic published in NIN on 18 October 1981: "On the 'Kardeljization' of the System". Translation of this article is published in JPRS 79705, 22 Dec 1981, No 1951 of this series pp 60-64]

[Text] One passage in the committed and topical article on our present "moment of truth" (M. Kesetovic, NIN, No 1607, 18 October 1981) deserves particular examination. That is, in analyzing the causes of our present difficulties, certain "saviors" assert that the source of the problem lies in "Kardeljization of the system." I categorically concur in Kesetovic's view that the truth is precisely the opposite--our practice has been "de-Kardeljized" to such an extent and is so much out of line with our commitments in the constitution, system and principles we have adopted, that one would do better to look here for the principal explanation of our present situation. I also have certain specific reasons of my own for such an opinion, and I sense the need and duty to substantiate it.

In the last years of Kardelj's life I had the good fortune to work alongside this great man of our own and the world's communist movement. I had occasion to see for myself the extent to which this tireless creator was the exact opposite of certain notions about him which were circulated covertly about the man himself while he was alive and now are being circulated ever more openly about his work as well.

Those who speak about "Kardeljization" of the system in a pejorative sense certainly know quite well that "Kardeljization" is actually "Titoization." Kardelj's work is so Titoist in all its elements that it is impossible to distinguish it.

In their work, and especially in that which has not yet been published, there is so much that is topical that it is impossible to seek a way out of our current problem without constantly turning to the creativity of these inseparable great men of our revolution. The example of Kosovo best confirms this for us. Comrades Tito and Kardelj issued a timely warning about the situation we had got in. Only now have their warnings become accessible to the public. What good fortune it would have been if that had been at the time when those admonitions were uttered, since then the public would probably have reacted more constructively than those to whom those warnings were addressed.

Had the Public Known

It can be said without exaggeration that truly there are no current problems on which the published or unpublished works of E. Kardelj do not contain answers, not only in principle, but even very concrete answers. We are knocking on many doors that are already open. For example, there is a great deal of talk now about the harmfulness of "OUR-ization" [OUR = organization of associated labor] and the fragmentation of our economy, about local, republic or other barriers within the framework of the unified Yugoslav market, about the payments balances of the republics and about the further growth of our indebtedness, about the trade imbalance, the growth of imports, and especially about certain "manias" which have truly taken on proportions contrary to all good sense. These are the mania for investments, the mania for licenses, the mania for SIZ's [self-managing community of interest], etc. At the same time these developments are being linked to our system or even to its "Kardeljization," but no one mentions, or not sufficiently aware, that it was Comrade Kardelj who in the last years of his life waged a tireless struggle against precisely those things. "OUR-ization" is a particular danger to self-management, since there is no self-management without integration and association of the entire Yugoslav economy, Kardelj warned. Had the public known of certain timely warnings related to our present crisis, then certainly no one would have been able to sell it "a pig in a poke," nor speak about the need for "de-Kardeljization" of the system. It would be easier to know who is only verbally and who is really in favor of Tito's road to socialism and continuation of that road, to know what the real resistance and lack of comprehension is, and to know what is outright "rooting" for someone else's solution to problems which are above all ours. The public must know at least by now that Comrades Tito and Kardelj noted in time, issued warnings and vigorously fought for resolution of the problems which have now taken on proportions that are disturbing to everyone.

First about our present crisis situation. Comrade Kardelj "sounded the alarm" back in 1974, at the time when the negative impact of the world economic crisis was just beginning to be felt. Together with Comrade Tito he emphasized the need for economic stabilization as an essential precondition for our internal stability and independent international position, and he advocated an entire program of stabilization measures.

From 1977 up until his death Comrade Kardelj was extremely worried by the deterioration of our economic situation, especially by the uncontrolled growth of all forms of spending, prices, the payments deficit and the contracting of indebtedness, and that not only to cover the mania for investments, but also imports and current spending. Disappointed that his warnings had not been received with enough seriousness and responsibility, he openly cautioned that "this is not at all a time for arguing about whether the situation should be dramatized, about whether matters are critical, since the figures are serious enough in and of themselves."

Now they are far more serious, and yet some people are still amazed that our present difficulties are being "dramatized." For Kardelj to sound the alarm was not to "cause a panic," but to responsibly discharge obligations and duties. Just before his death Comrade Kardelj even warned that if we failed to straighten

out the situation in a radical way we could experience the "fate of Chile," which was preceded by economic chaos and domestic destabilization. He thought about presenting his fear in public in the form of an interview or the like. Now when his most pessimistic fears are being borne out, there is a need not only for the public to know what kind of warnings those were, but also to define its attitude toward solutions which Comrade Kardelj was not able to carry through.

Against "Octuplication" of Capacities

Kardelj was energetically opposed to the mania for contracting foreign indebtedness at a time when this had not yet taken on the proportions which have in recent years brought us to a level of indebtedness that is truly beyond all justifiability. He was for credits not being taken to resolve our current problems, but exclusively for the needs of development. Even today we are in a situation where we are taking credit even for petroleum. He also called for matters to be put to rights in the entire domain of our economic relations with foreign countries, in which extreme liberalism and lack of organization predominate. He was also specifically concerned with the problems of our foreign trade network, and he suggested that a law be passed which would serve as the foundation for prohibiting the operation of our representative offices abroad which handle only import transactions. All import transactions should be conducted within the country, and anyone interested in selling should come to Yugoslavia and here in the country buy what fits into our priorities from the standpoint of the associated Yugoslav economy.

As for modernization of our economy, Kardelj was for purchasing technology on the basis of the coordinated priorities of the associated Yugoslav economy rather than for all possible licenses and technologies of all manner of producers to be obtained through a mania for licenses and joint ventures. That is why he condemned cases not only of duplication, but of "octuplication" of capacities.

Recently there has been much justified public criticism of the SIZ's. There is talk not only of SIZ-omania, but even of actual SIZ-ophrenia. However, even in this case not enough people know that Kardelj was more severe in his criticism of the practice of the SIZ's than our critics today. He warned back in 1974 that "if we allow things to get out of hand in the SIZ's, those who are attacking our system of self-management will bend this to their own end." He was the first to begin talking about SIZ-omania and even about SIZ-ocracy as a new variety of our technobureaucracy. If things are left to go their own way, Kardelj said, another form of government bodies will be created: in other words, what our present critics of the SIZ's detect as their parastatal functions. In other words, according to Kardelj, if this practice were to continue, then we would create a kind of "parallel government" in society which we would one day have to "destroy by revolutionary means."

Unfortunately, we have continued with that practice and we have reached the point Kardelj warned about, but the public is not aware of those warnings of his. The SIZ's, especially in the domain of material production, ought not to have power, nor funds, nor a staff. In practice, they today have a staff which

according to certain estimates (about 50,000) is threefold greater than the number of people on the federal payroll. Not only does this staff have power, but that power has taken on a character which is leading toward new forms of alienation of the working class from management of the results of its labor.

Accordingly, when we speak of "Kardeljization" or "de-Kardeljization" of our practice, the public must be aware of Kardelj's authentic warnings and positions. They exist not only concerning the several issues we have just mentioned, but also, I repeat, on practically all our current problems and difficulties.

The question inevitably arises how it is possible that Comrade Kardelj did not manage to put through the solutions he advocated jointly with Comrade Tito? Had he succeeded in this, we certainly would not have been in these difficulties. One should not forget that the role of Comrade Kardelj was inestimable as the "most imaginative architect of the Tito era," that we have the foundations of our strategy already built, that we have the constitution, the Law on Associated Labor, and a number of laws embodying the system, and that the directions for development of the political system have been set down and were adopted as the basic decision of the 11th LCY Congress. All of this has been adopted as by plebiscite as the "rules of the game" of our society.

However, Comrade Kardelj did not hide the fact that in the practical implementation of the policy that had been adopted, especially in a society like ours, there are not only objective difficulties and lack of understanding, but also open resistance. Never did Kardelj dogmatically defend any solutions or commitments on our road toward the building of socialism. As a matter of fact, it was he who wrote the famous sentence in the LCY Program to the effect that "nothing is sacred." However, he was uncompromising when it came to the foundations of the system and our ideological and strategic commitments. And it is precisely they which are under attack during this crisis in the seventies, which, according to Kardelj, "must never be allowed to happen again." Then, as indeed now, the technobureaucratic forces, in a tie-up with nationalism especially, are becoming the greatest danger to authentic socialist self-management.

Kardelj advocated concrete resolution of concrete problems in accordance with the undisputed and generally accepted goals. It is only along that road that the real answer can be found as to where the problem is and what should be changed: practice or a particular solution? That is why, according to Kardelj, the concrete problems must always be resolved in "an unceasing checking against the revolutionary goals of our society." Now that we have gotten into a crisis situation, it is time to adopt that pattern of action.

7045

CSO: 2800/142

EXCESSIVE FEDERAL STAFFS, PRIVILEGES DUE FOR CUTS

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1608, 25 Oct 81 pp 20-21

[Interview with Rajko Gagovic, chairman of Administrative Commission of Yugoslav Assembly, by Dragan Jovanovic: "A Fifth Are Superfluous"--date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Since last Wednesday, officials' apartments and Mercedes with low registrations have again been in the public eye. A committee of the Federal Council for Sociopolitical Relations of the Assembly of Yugoslavia has approved a proposed change in the law on the issue of official apartments and the use of official automobiles, a law which is to be in effect by November. All of this did not take place without the usual delegates and others being upset as usual.

Rajko Gagovic, the chairman of the Administrative Commission of the SFRY Assembly, feels that there is not much new to say about the apartments and Mercedes, except the bleak but clear provisions with which the public is already familiar. For Gagovic, the automobiles are "exaggerated and disappearing trivia" from the life of the federal administration.

When he says that the use of apartments and Mercedes is trivia, Gagovic is referring to something else: "I assert that in the sociopolitical relations of the SFRY Assembly and in the federal administration in general, there are many more employees and officials than necessary. A great deal would be saved if numbers of positions were reduced and if a new systematization and a better organization of labor took place. Even labor discipline in the federal administration is fairly lax--from being late to work, taking coffee breaks during working hours and holding unnecessary meetings, to using annual leave in two or three parts, while it is difficult to punish a nonworker in the administration. A program is being prepared right now according to which the number of employees is to be reduced in the next 5 years, and the administration is to be organized more efficiently."

[Question] Is it known at least approximately how many superfluous employees and officials there are?

[Answer] "About 15,000 people are employed in the federal administration, and about 700 employees and officials in the Assembly of Yugoslavia. I do not know how much of a reduction would have to be made in the federal administration in general, but in the Assembly of Yugoslavia at least 20 percent of the employees and officials are superfluous," says Gagovic.

[Question] Still, could we say something about apartments?

Ordinary Efficiency Apartments and Two-Room Ones

[Answer] So far, the apartments, as a rule, have been issued to officials for long-term use. According to the new decision, which will probably come into effect by November, the apartments will be given for official use as long as the employment lasts, and now a 1-year term is most frequent. Thus, an official, a user of an apartment, who comes to Belgrade, does not abandon the apartment in the republic or province from which he comes, but rather in Belgrade receives an efficiency or at most a two-room apartment which he has to give back at the end of the year.

[Question] What will determine the size of the apartment received?

[Answer] This primarily depends on the importance of his position, his years of service, and the entertainment requirements of the position. For example, the president of the Federal Executive Council and the assistant secretary for finances cannot have the same apartment, the more so because 2 years ago both the president of the Federal Executive Council and the president of the SFRY Assembly renounced the right to a residence.

[Question] Are there also two-room efficiency apartments?

[Answer] Yes, there are also two-room ones, and there are also both furnished and unfurnished apartments, and larger rents.

[Question] Who receives an apartment in Belgrade?

[Answer] Only officials who serve for a term of 4 or 8 years, and these are mostly judges of the supreme or constitutional courts and other judicial organs.

[Question] Who can receive an apartment in Belgrade, on a long-term basis and according to the new law?

[Answer] Only an official who has left an apartment in his previous place of residence, or one who is retiring at the expiration of his position and wishes to remain in Belgrade.

[Question] Can officials change their apartments?

[Answer] They can exchange smaller ones for larger ones, especially if their families become larger, but according to the new regulations they will not be able to exchange one larger one for two smaller ones, and an official apartment cannot be inherited. It is felt that these innovations alone will introduce more efficiency and more funds for residential construction. Naturally, irregularities and manipulations of official apartments will be avoided; these have taken place, and as a result of them the residential fund of federal organs and organizations has been depleted and the records have become unreliable.

Mercedes With One Passenger

Gagovic also responded willingly to questions about the new regulations for the use of official automobiles. We will single out only the answers that the daily press,

interpreting the new provisions, has not mentioned. Trips with an official automobile outside Belgrade for employees of the SFRY Assembly are approved personally by the secretary general of the assembly, and trips by official vehicles to foreign countries can be approved only by the president of the Assembly of Yugoslavia. Next, an assembly employee can use an official car only if he is doing work for the SFRY Assembly, and not other sociopolitical work, such as, let us say, leaving for a republican congress. The number of users who have a right to transportation from home to work has been drastically reduced. In addition to the president of the SFRY Assembly and the president of the Federal Executive Council, this right was retained only by the vice president of the assembly, the members of the Federal Executive Council, the presidents of assembly councils, the general secretary and several others.

[Question] In last week's assembly debate, delegate Ilija Bukic asked why official automobiles are used most on Saturdays and Sundays.

[Answer] "We checked, and this is not correct," Gagovic replied forcefully.

Here, our interlocutor considered it appropriate to mention as well other conservation measures taken by the federation. First, entertainment allowances, except for foreigners, have been completely abolished. "Find in any prominent Belgrade restaurant or hotel a domestic commercial meal that we have paid for, report it to me, and I will pay you for it in gold," says Gagovic. "Alcoholic beverages are no longer poured in the offices of officials. Only one reception has remained in the protocol of the federation, the one for 29 November. Trips abroad have been restricted, and will be limited even more, except for the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs."

Our interlocutor, however, still remains faithful to the position mentioned at the beginning of this article, according to which these are trifles that really mean a fair amount.

In a report recently sent by the Federal Executive Council to the delegates of the Federal Council, it is said that: "...it is felt that there are not too many unassigned and available workers..." And there are "only" 180 of them.

Is this also a trifle?

9909

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ABSENCE OF OFFICIALS' INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY EXPLORED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1609, 1 Nov 81 pp 24-25

[Article by Nenad I. Kecmanovic]

[Text] What is a capable politician in a socialistic, self-managed society? Is it a man who possesses a broad, universal cultural knowledge, or who primarily possesses some specialized knowledge, or, is it most important that he be thoroughly versed in Marxism?

How much would the possible comprehension of the more specific characteristics of politics as a profession, or about the optimal characteristics of its representatives, their inherent inclinations, be able to help us in the realization of democratic elections and of socialistic self-management personnel policy? A great deal, of course, but not enough considering that our public has a quite insignificant insight into the individual qualities of its representatives in professional politics, much less be able to point with confidence at the competent or the incompetent.

Institutions and the "Free-shooters"

It is interesting that the struggle against the forum style of work, decisionmaking by cabinet, and the closed nature of the political structure to the eyes and ears of the public, has never, at least not explicitly, encompassed the struggle for the democratic verification of the personal contribution of each social and political worker as well. In the tradition of our political life, the focus has always been placed on the authority of the institution, the organ and the organization, but the individual public remarks, which stand out even less than the agreed upon positions, except when one is dealing with a small group of the most distinguished leaders, are treated as "butting in," "free-shooting," "being in too much of a hurry," acting in an undisciplined manner, trying to act like a leader, having an unhealthy ambition to distinguish oneself, etc.

In an interview last year for the DELO of Ljubljana, Stipe Suvar grappled with this problem: "You say that it is not possible for the man whom everyone applauds to be a good politician; I say that he is good who does not profess. If a man professes, then he can be extremely ambiguous. If someone wants to pursue a political career in peacetime, he will do best if he does not break the rule, i.e. in an almost religious sense, what is allowed and what is not. For the most part, these are not

legally formed rules. Every large organization spawns its internal rules of life and behavior. That is why it is very important how a man fits into the organization and that he not stick out, that everything for the most part is in order. No one bothers you, and you yourself don't bother anyone."

The struggle between different opinions is basically desirable and probably is expressed in closed meetings of the appropriate political forums, but these differences in viewpoint usually do not leave these meetings. As a rule, unified positions are disclosed to the public, originally by the leading people, and the rest are repeated in developed form, so that both the individual contributions and failures continually remain unknown for the electorate. That is why the phenomenon of retirement under the pressure of public opinion is unknown in our system, in the same way that political ascent on the basis of mass support and popularity is also unheard of. No reasonable person accuses the minister of a particular area for a foreign-trade imbalance, no one holds the finance minister responsible for inflation, or the person responsible for ensuring supplies for shortages of coffee or oil.

But then it remains for us to ask: How do we know who is a capable politician and who is not, or, for whom do we vote and for whom do we not?

It might be said that the young generation of our political officials, lacking the "revolutionary pedigree" from the period of the underground, wartime whirlwind and the socialistic restoration, is particularly handicapped by the delineated style of lack of exposure. Personal capability and individual contribution have, indeed, very little opportunity to break out of the apparition of the authority of the office for which they are employed, or the organ or institution in which they operate.

The Tito initiative had, it seems to us, in addition to everything else, the objective of overcoming these weaknesses in our political life. Collective labor and responsibility, that is, decisionmaking and governing, and the limitation of the mandate must directly expand the creative expression of all members of the political leadership, and do this at all levels, it must provoke the constructive competition of capabilities, and in particular, their public affirmation, which may be the only way of establishing the trust and support of the masses, not only in the election process. A one-sided interpretation of the Tito initiative which would only proceed in the direction of removing the perennial supremacy of isolated officials at the head of the governing political bodies, would bring as much harm as it would benefit. This would only be a step further in the strengthening of some abstract collective authority which would be constructed on the impersonality of its active adherents. If nothing else, this version of the Tito initiative, which would de facto eliminate every personality from the Yugoslav political scene, would take the procedure of political elections down a literal blind alley.

Teamwork is not an attack on individual creativity. When our football team provides fine collective play in front of thousands of people at the stadium and millions of viewers on television, then even those who are not experts in sports can clearly see which players shine and which disappoint. When we are talking about our political team, the individual contribution remains, on the whole, unknown to the public; only the experts know who is doing what.

Discussing this problem in either context, Brank Mikulic at one time stressed that the Tito initiative did not have as its purpose the destruction of the social prestige of our distinguished social and political workers, but only to free it of the mystification which the function sometimes represents. He illustrated this with examples from Kardelj and Vlahovic and still other giants of our revolution, who in recent years have not found their political activities at the head of any organ or organization, but in spite of this neither their work nor their personalities have lost any of the former authority. As a supplement to the Mikulic evaluation, we might also cite contemporary examples of discussions which have been conducted in the highest state and party bodies of the federation right after the dramatic events in Kosovo. The frank, energetic, and well-considered statements of Lazar Kolisevski, Danet Cujic, Slavko Sajber, Bosko Siljanovski, Vojo Srzentic, and many other social and political workers from all areas of our country were given no less attention than the presentations of the authors who presided over the meetings of these organs. In brief, these were positive, and fortunately, not isolated examples of public affirmation of individual access and contribution in the line of programed determinations of our society, and these were independent of the authority of the various functions which these people momentarily occupied, which means they were precisely in the spirit of the authentic understanding of the Tito initiative.

A Screen To Hide Political Silence

On the other hand, the opportunistic passivity, playing the waiting game, playing it safe, careerism, avoidance of personal responsibility, the impoverishment, or the concealment of one's own position, the withdrawal into the anonymity of would-be collective work, do not represent only the universal pathological syndrome of behavior inside the socialistic, self-management society, but also the special problem in carrying out democratic elections. Quite simply, how do you vote for someone who continuously refuses to establish open and sincere, let alone political, contact with you. It would be futile to try to remove this from the new columns, the screen, the radio waves, the meetings and the speaker's platform if, as Milovan Danojlic would say, one suffers from logorrhea (the disease of loquaciousness). "A man does not only speak when he has something to say, but also when he does not. As well as so many other talents, the power of speech can be twisted and directed at the wrong purposes, but it cannot be revoked. Then comes a break in the process of communication; the beginning of babbling, of talking for the sake of talking.... Everywhere the content is empty, and the purpose is only that of talking." When he suffers from acute logorrhea, the politician blocks communication with the electorate. The barrage of noisy and empty phrases which are foolishly repeated has to serve as an imposing screen for political silence.

When its existing, two-way, officially proclaimed line of communication is interrupted, the base is inclined to establish a one-way, informal, underground connection. To put it in more specific terms: concerning the politician of whom one does not know what he has done or what he has failed to do, where he has hit and where he has missed, what he thinks and to what extent he tries to hear the voice of the people, there begins to take place an increase in the guessing, the assumptions, the slander, the retelling of stories, the gossip, the fabrications, the half-truths, good and bad, but always incomplete accounts of the truth. The lack of genuine information which concerns us is legitimately compensated for by people's imagination, always ready to be stimulated by the slightest kernel of truth.

Private and Public Life of Elected Officials

Even in the scope of reviewing the so-called private life of a "political personality," to which the electorate is by right not indifferent, we, it seems, have still not found the proper solution. We are quite justified in our negative assessment of the Western model with its sensationalistic invasion into the personal and family life of the stars of the political scene, as well as of the Eastern model which unnaturally reduces the image of the distinguished politician to a function, and which wraps everything that comes out of this strict, official, rigid framework in a veil of mystery. Our own model, which should exemplify our social and political context and the spirit of the times, we have not, however, constructed and defined more precisely. Having abandoned the wartime and postwar formula of publicly verified asceticism even outside of the job, which legitimately brought forth many tragicomic excesses, we went, one should say, to the other extreme in the treatment of the right to a private life. Complete separation of private and public life is not only against communist ethics, but in some excessive manifestations has promoted the sort of example of double-standard morality and lifestyle which falls below the level of civil norms of behavior.

In the light of all the problems enumerated above, the no less insignificant dilemma about whether to put one or more candidates before the electorate, around which our pre-election discussions usually turn, can seem like getting off the track. As soon as it is so, it will no longer be a problem: all of the discussions in principle long ago gave the unambiguous response that every election means an alternative. But does the problem amount only to this?

9548

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TALES OF FORCED MIGRATION FROM KOSOVO RECOUNTED

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1612, 22 Nov 81
pp 20-21

[Article by Aleksandar Tijanic: "Why They Left"]

[Text] Dragoslav Stankovic, a peasant from near Gnjilane, who now lives in Smederevo, explained his departure from Kosovo this way:

"You have to get out when the blame is not put on those who do the beating, but those who are beaten!" Dragoslav planted wheat on his field in Kosovo in 1979. When he went from Smederevo to reap it, there was not a single spike left in the field--all had been reaped and carried away. Judicial proceedings against the robbers are still going on. He told this in a meeting of Serbs and Montenegrins who had left Kosovo and settled in Smederevo Opstina with representatives of the opstina commission for investigating emigration, as well as with Hisen Prekazi and Vukasin Jokanovic from the provincial commission and Miodrag Trifunovic, a member of the republic commission.

This was a meeting which was held last Friday in the auditorium of the Slavija Local Community in Smederevo; it lasted exactly 5 hours. Some 100 immigrants out of the total 6,000 in this opstina attended the meeting. They were all men, mostly between the ages of 40 and 50 who had immigrated here between 1955 and 1981.

Reasons and Destinies

Aside from one physician and a few retired people, those in the auditorium also included lawyers, professional managers, and engineers, but most were workers and farm laborers.

Those who attended were informed that a working group had been created in Serbia to analyze the emigration. In its work it is using the materials of opstina commissions; then a survey conducted among 5,000 emigrants; 1,800 people have been interviewed; complaints and charges filed with republic agencies have been analyzed; and statistical data and information of law enforcement agencies have been used. All of this, it was said, comprises a sound basis for analyzing the causes of the emigration and for formulating proposals for a long-term solution of this problem. The analysis has shown that the predominant reasons for

emigration were various forms of pressure in the workplace, on the street, in schools, on farms.... This analysis, the audience was told that evening, has been examined in a meeting of the Serbian Republic Executive Council and the Federal Executive Council.

"Since the provincial committee is at the end of its task, frank and direct conversation in the presence of the comrades from Kosovo concerning the causes of your emigration will be useful to them in this responsible task," Miodrag Trifunovic said.

Hisen Prekazi then added that such talks had already been held in Kraljevo and Kragujevac and that they are a valuable contribution to an objective analysis.

Some 20 people spoke up. Among the first was Branko Miselic, who left Pristina in 1969. He had been chief of the department for municipal services in Pristina when in 1968 he was beaten when he and a group of activists were attempting to prevent demonstrators from demolishing the city. He moved away when, as he says, he realized that the demonstrators were under "someone's protection." In Smederevo he has become manager of an enterprise, but he says that he had it better in Kosovo. That is where his friends and relatives have remained.

"My in-laws, who live on Goles, complained that their Albanian neighbors have intentionally driven livestock onto their farm. I went to the local community, later even to the police, to seek protection for them. They replied that there is a commission which is resolving problems of this kind. These people simply do not understand--when the most reputable owner of a farm leaves a village because of pressure, the other Serbs and Montenegrins immediately ask themselves: What reason is there now for us to wait?" Miselic said.

Podujevo Opstina has a population of 77,000. Back 20 years ago there were 10,000 Serbs and Montenegrins living there. Today, according to published figures, there is a total of 2,860. Svetozar Garic moved out of Donja Dubnica near Podujevo 6 years ago. He says that for all practical purposes there is not a single Serbian family left in that village which was once predominantly Serbs.

"We did not leave for economic reasons; we had large farms there. Most of my fellow villagers left because of a conflict with Albanian neighbors. For years their livestock had been destroying my crops. They would beat my children between home and school. That is why I transferred them to a school several kilometers away and they would take a roundabout route. I decided in spite of everything to stay in Dubnica at all costs. However, little by little I was left by myself. And then there were troubles one after another at work, and twice I was laid off. It became impossible. I boarded up the windows and door in a five-room house, left behind 10 hectares of fields and forest and came here to live as a subtenant. I tried to sell the farm, but my neighbors drove all the purchasers away with threats that they intended to buy the farm. I put a value of 270 million on the land and buildings: they told me that 90 was enough. While I was here, the neighbors cut down the trees in my woods, their livestock grazed on my grass, so now they do not even need to purchase the farm. They are not even members of the human race."

Jerotije Petrovic from Ajvalija spent 22 years in the mines together with the miners as a highly skilled mechanic.

"I saw that the situation was bad when the manager found me talking Serbian to a friend, Goranac, whom he shouted out to speak Albanian to me. A few days later Redza happened to fall asleep by the water pump, and 300 miners were waiting for the water to recede. The young technician who had just come from Kragujevac woke up Redza, and the latter responded by breaking two of his teeth. The lad packed up and returned to Kragujevac the same day. It was then that I thought perhaps it was time for me to go, too. I had 1.5 hectares of land which an Albanian neighbor had his eye on. I went to mow the hay when I heard a clicking behind me. I turned around, and my neighbor was reloading his pistol. I asked him: 'Say, neighbor, what are you doing there?' And he said: 'Get out of the field, a darkness has fallen upon my eyes, I cannot see anything!' Thus I fled, leaving behind my scythe, my farm and my house. For a long time I was unable to sell what I had built up in 22 years of work in the mine, since my neighbor had got word around that it was his field. I sold the farm with the help of an honest Albanian, to whom I gave a good commission, and he found me a buyer in some other village. The purchaser, an Albanian, had five sons and was not afraid of my neighbor. I told him everything--that he had been threatening and that he had been demanding my field. He said: Let him go screw himself, I am buying it with my own money!"

Dragomir Stevic, lawyer, came from Pristina in 1973, but he often goes to Kosovo to see his relatives and friends:

"I feel a moral duty here to say how many honest Albanians there are, my comrades, colleagues and acquaintances, people whom I am glad to see even today. In the present situation, believe me, it is hardest on them," Stevic said among other things.

General and Specific Parts

And thus word by word, for all of 5 hours. The people from Kosovo noted down every fact. Thus a place was also found for a certain policeman named Zeco, a village tyrant, from whom, someone said, they "received many a blow."

If we set aside the portions of the statements which have to do with actions set in Kosovo on the basis of emotional subjectivity, and they occur everywhere, the following facts remain. Almost all the immigrants, those who spoke up and those with whom we conversed, asserted that they were better off materially in Kosovo. They said that by selling their houses, livestock and farms they had become poor people instead of property owners. They said that direct pressure was exerted on them or that they felt the general climate to be pressure. They argue that other members of their families had also been subjected to pressure.

They said that there was no effective protection against the bullying either from the police or the courts. They then added that they sold their property below its value, but in spite of everything, they said, they would gladly return to Kosovo if conditions were different.

There were people emigrating even from the end of the war, but emigration was more intensive after 1966 and 1968, and then, because of well-known circumstances, in 1981 the emigration took on the form of flight, the emigrants said.

At the end of the meeting we asked Vukasin Jokanovic if the reasons mentioned for emigration were the same as those alleged by people in Kosovo in their application for emigration. Jokanovic said that the applications are not identical, and that the people in Kosovo, aiming at an early departure, are avoiding complications and are giving other reasons in their statements. That is why, according to him, the commission there does not consider their statements to be objective.

The differences in the statements are obvious. This leads one to reflect that the conclusions and indeed even the solutions offered, both in Kosovo and outside it, could vary. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why a section of the provincial commission was talking to emigrants in these cities in Serbia. In Smederevo we were unable to obtain the analysis of the commission there, since, we were told, it had been classified as a "government secret." Some of the figures are known from Kosovo. In Pristina there were 1,265 applications for emigration between 11 March and 9 November. Of the 930 applications examined, some kind of pressure is mentioned in only 8 cases. In 10 years 2,750 people left Urosevac. Officially only one because of pressure: a bus driver who got in an argument with an Albanian passenger and after that left for Krusevac.

The new situation obviously imposes the need to search for dual causes: causes for the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and causes behind their giving false reasons in their applications, which they change after they leave Kosovo. Speaking about this, Sefki Ferovic, chairman of the commission in Pristina, said that in Kosovo there is not enough activity in the effort to combat all forms of pressures by Albanian nationalism and that there are cases of opportunism, of refraining from accusations, of avoiding conflict in the taking of political and legal measures against the Albanian and other chauvinists. This was also confirmed by the people in Smederevo, who say that they do not yet see the real effect of the effort to create conditions which would prevent a large-scale exodus. If nothing radical is done soon, they say, then later it perhaps will not have any practical value at all.

The commissions are readier to grant consent to emigration if the grounds are "embellished." Once their consent is obtained, there is no problem obtaining the notice of departure from the police; this certificate is in turn necessary to give notice of one's taking up residence somewhere else. If specific pressure is alleged as the reason--there is no consent to the departure until the accuracy of the testimony is established. Thus the commission has become an administrative barrier to emigration. Many people are leaving even without the consent. That has led to an obvious change of argument: instead of analyzing the cause of emigration, the commissions are studying the justifiability of applications for emigration. The number of applications directed is not small--in Pristina alone 274 have been rejected out of a total of 930. This also suggests that the committee is in a way expanding its powers even beyond the constitutional principles concerning the freedom of movement and choice of place to live and work.

In the joint session of the Presidium of the Serbian LC [League of Communists] Central Committee and the Presidency of SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia on Monday it was emphasized that it was indispensable to take all necessary political and other measures to halt the emigration from Kosovo, to guarantee creation of conditions for return of those families who emigrated under various pressures and want to go back, and to study the possibilities of a fair reimbursement of those citizens who sold their property under various pressures at a price below the real value.

At the end of the Smederevo meeting someone asked Prekazi whether people in the province were examining the possibilities for a return of Serbs and Montenegrins who had moved out of Kosovo?

"Eh, if we were able to bring back two or three for a start, it would be a great encouragement for all of us," Prekazi said.

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SELF-MANAGING INTEREST COMMUNITIES UNDER FIRE

'Struggle Between Two Bureaucracies'

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1610, 8 Nov 81
pp 12-14

[Article by Scepan Rabrenovic: "Money From Someone Else's Pocket"]

[Text] Do you perhaps know how many self-managing communities of interest there are in the country? According to the most recent statistical data, last year there were precisely 7,826 of them, or about 300 more than in the previous year. It is equally true that there are more of them today than there were yesterday and that tomorrow there may be more of them than there are today.

At a meeting in Belgrade a few days ago it was said that the way things are going, soon every street would have its own self-managing community of interest. It seems that whenever a problem is not clear to us or when agreement is not reached on the solution to a problem, we have to have another SIZ [self-managing community of interest]. And it also happens this way: as soon as a little bit of money is put together, a SIZ is established to spend it. And the SIZ's are past masters at that.

The problem, of course, does not lie in the number of SIZ's, but in the way they operate and the way they spend money. But that is not the whole matter: it is well known that the SIZ's have great power, that they are on a par with the government, and that the more money they have, the greater their power.

Last week in a session of the Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly in which implementation of the assembly resolution on the free exchange of labor was being debated Dr Boro Petkovski, a delegate, presented the datum in his introductory statement that 3,842 self-managing communities in the social services last year had at their disposition 18.7 percent of the total social product. We calculated that those "18.7 percent" amounted to about 290 billion dinars last year.

How much is 290 billion dinars? A great deal. Still more when we realize that about 167 billion dinars were left to the economy in that same year to expand plant and equipment and for reserves. And that in a year of which it is said that the position of the economy in distribution improved.

According to the most recent statistical data published by EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Belgrade, the revenues of self-managing communities of interest in the social services in the first 8 months of this year amounted to 247 billion dinars, by the end of the year this amount will climb to 400 billion dinars, or about 100 billion dinars less than the net personal incomes that will be paid to employees in the economy.

It is not difficult to conclude on the basis of these figures that social service expenditure is high, that is, above the level of the country's economic development. In this situation both those furnishing the money and those spending it are dissatisfied. Associated labor because it is impoverished and because this impoverishment has lasted for a long time, and employees in the social services because the funds they have received are inadequate. It is quite certain that the standard of living of both has fallen since the self-managing communities of interest were established.

Both Are Poor

The problem seems to lie above all in unwise expenditure of money, and the money is being spent unwisely because of the autonomous and independent behavior of those who are spending it, frequently with the sponsorship of the SIZ's themselves. It is said, for example, that every opstina or regional self-managing community of interest for health care endeavors to have its own clinical centers with expensive equipment. The situation is similar with education: there has been a virtual deluge of junior and senior postsecondary schools.

But when the self-managing communities of interest were established, the intention was for them to be a place where the producers and those spending the money would reach agreement on their common interests, and the purpose of all this would be to increase the productivity of plant and equipment of associated labor. Fictitious illness and the numerous university students educated with no regard for the development of the economy can only increase the costs.

The social services have to be paid for, and no one disputes that. The question is only how to optimize that payment and how those paying the bill are to have an insight into the spending of the funds. The supposition is that this will be possible by virtue of free exchange of labor through the self-managing communities of interest. It has turned out that this is neither free, nor is it an exchange of labor. There are quite a few people who now say that it is not even possible for labor to be exchanged: How, for example, are skilled and unskilled labor to be "exchanged"? One obstacle crippling the so-called free exchange of labor has been the fact that no true measure exists of the results of labor--not only of the results in the social services, but not even of the results in associated labor. How, then, is an exchange of labor going to occur at all? This is that pivotal question around which everything revolves, but it is also a question which is not being posed often enough.

Instead of that, we have been too much concerned, and we still are, with purely organizational matters: with the makeup of the self-managing communities of interest, with their proper number, with the question of the level at which they are to be established and how large their staff should be on the basis of what

was said in that session of the Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly, the self-managing communities of interest are not so much self-managing organizations as they are the long arm of the state or some kind of parallel government organizations. We quote the words of Dr Boro Petkovski: "The system of organization through self-managing communities of interest has shown a tendency to become independent of other essential components...the SIZ's have begun to develop into parastatal organizations of a sort...as protectors of the interests of society in the sphere of the social services."

And that, it was said, accounts for the "marked presence of state-ownership elements in social ownership." How else and otherwise to explain that the self-managing communities of interest are being financed fiscally--on a budgetary basis.

This method of financing has had the result that the funds appropriated are "lost," become anonymous, so that hardly anyone knows what is happening to them, how they are being spent--only the results are known, and they are not good. The self-managing communities of interest have almost become transformed into a prototype of a present-day bureaucratic institution--into the opposite, that is, of the model which was aimed at. In basic organizations of associated labor, for example, little is known about what is happening to the funds appropriated for housing construction and about all the channels through which those funds travel. Leave to one side that in many communities there are complaints that this money is being used to build stadiums or certain other projects--it is a fact that the resources are greater than the resulting housing units. Last year about 30 billion dinars earmarked for housing construction went unspent, and that in a situation of a housing shortage and when construction is becoming more and more expensive every day.

Hardly any notice was given to the statement which the trade union organization of the Beko clothing manufacturing firm of Belgrade prepared for the Third Congress of Self-Managers, in which it is evident that the workers of that work organization are setting aside more funds for housing construction every year than for investments in fixed capital, and that they are obtaining a negligibly small number of housing units in proportion to the funds appropriated. The Beko workers have therefore proposed that this kind of self-managing community of interest for housing be abolished.

Expenditures Which Have Been Hushed up

There are no figures on how much the staffs of the SIZ's cost. It seems that data on this are not recorded anywhere or are intentionally kept quiet. It is known only that last year the SIZ's as a whole employed 43,300 workers, who had an average monthly personal income of 8,757 dinars (employees in the economy earned 7,167 dinars last year on the average). It is also known that the SIZ's are categorized in statistical reports as sociopolitical communities and organizations. And not otherwise.

Were those the only costs, the economy could easily bear them, and the earnings of those 40,000 or so white-collar workers would not represent a great burden. It is known, however, that those are not the only costs, that there are also

certain others--anonymous expenditures which are not recorded. Two surveys prove that this is so. According to the first, which was conducted by Josip Stohan of the Economics Institute in Zagreb, at the beginning of the seventies public service expenditure did not exceed the level of the country's economic development. According to studies done by Dr Zoran Popov of the Institute of Economic Science in Belgrade, moreover, the economy's legal obligations amounted to 22 percent of its income up to the mid-seventies. After that those legal obligations increased to 26 percent of the economy's income. And that is precisely the time when the self-managing communities of interest were established. That 4-percent increase applied to the income of the economy represents a huge amount of money, and if it is actually true that all those funds went to maintain the staff of the SIZ's, then it might be said that a "low blow was dealt" to the working class at that time.

How much the government has also participated in that "blow" has depended on the extent to which the sociopolitical communities were and are now in a tie-up with the SIZ's. According to what was said in the session of the Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly, that tie-up has existed--especially at the time when the self-managing communities of interest were established.

Over the past year more criticism of the operation of the self-managing communities of interest has been coming from government bodies and agencies than from associated labor. This is no accident. The self-managing communities of interest, by the very fact that they have resources, have taken power away from government bodies and agencies. A republic secretary for culture, for example, has today considerably less influence than the secretary of that republic's self-managing community for culture. That is why criticism of the operation of the self-managing communities of interest coming from government entities takes on the appearance of a kind of courting of the working class. Actually this is a conflict between two bureaucracies in a battle for power which for the present associated labor is observing almost disinterestedly, out of a conviction that it cannot change anything.

A More Correct Pay Envelope

The economic troubles and the problems related to stabilization have only hastened the effort to resolve the problem of financing the social services. Everyone agrees that the economy should be given relief, it has been announced that the federal budget next year will be only slightly larger than last year, and it is assumed that social service expenditure next year will also be growing more slowly. However, the problem of financing the social services is not an urgent one solely for that reason. The SIZ's have become independent, they represent a kind of alienated power in society, and the interests of associated labor have been subordinated to them. The question is only what is to replace them, that is, how associated labor is to be afforded a greater influence on the spending of funds and how all this is to be a function of the development of both the social services and the economy.

One belief is that the workers in associated labor would be more interested in the way these funds are spent if the provision of the Law on Associated Labor concerning personal incomes as a gross category containing all taxes and contributions burdening the worker's personal income were implemented. Only a "more

correct pay envelope" would make it possible for the workers to see what they are financing and what amounts they are giving for that purpose. Solidarity funds are cited as an example of enhanced worker motivation in such a case: ever since the pay envelope has stated how much the worker is setting aside each month for the reconstruction of the Montenegrin coast, there have been more demands for closer monitoring of the expenditure of those funds. Previously, in the case of the earthquake in Skopje, for example, there were no such demands, since it did not say on the pay envelope how much each worker was setting aside each month to rebuild Skopje, but these funds were appropriated through a contribution which was not "visible" to the workers.

The influence of associated labor on the spending of these funds could also be achieved, according to some, if the funds were set aside on the basis of specific programs which would be adopted both by associated labor and also by the social services.

In a recent statement to NIN on the need for an economic and social reform, Dr Ljubisav Markovic, the well-known professor and economist and chairman of the Committee for the Plan of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the Yugoslav Assembly, said among other things: "There must be a thorough examination of the condition of the so-called special-interest organizations. A substantial portion of the services should be paid for out of the net income of economic organizations and the workers."

Interview With Assembly Personage

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1610, 8 Nov 81
pp 12-13

[Interview with Dr Miodrag Visnjic, chairman of the Commission of the Serbian Assembly for Special-Interest Organization in the Social Services, by Dragan Jovanovic: "It Is Not Just the SIZ's We Blame"; date and place not specified]

[Text] In the recent past, when talk is revived about SIZocracy, SIZomania and other "SIZisms," the fashionable anti-SIZ euphoria has been mentioned least. Dr Miodrag Visnjic, a man who by virtue of his political office and scientific affinity has been concerned with the self-managing communities of interest, let us know at the very outset of the interview that he has a somewhat different position on this issue.

The self-managing communities of interest have indeed with good reason been subjected to fierce criticism because of many shortcomings. There is no dispute about this. But the criticism ranges from certain demands for improvements to the idea of abolishing the SIZ's. What stands behind those demands for doing away with them? Is it a solution to return the funds to budget-financed agencies of the republics and opstinas? Dr Visnjic says,

[Question] What is the origin of these efforts?

[Answer] No distinction is made between criticism of the concept and criticism of practice. As for the theoretical concept of special-interest organization,

perhaps we did not think everything through, but by and large the constitutional concept cannot be disputed. But the criticism of practice is by and large appropriate.

[Question] What should be done to bring the theory and the practice of the SIZ's into conformity?

[Answer] It is obvious that we need a radical step in optimizing the structure of the SIZ's, since there are a very great many of them. They have been formed even for things that did not require them. Certain needs of the citizens and the working people and certain social services could have been met without organizing SIZ's. A SIZ for every street or for every facility leads nowhere. Especially when the attitude has been adopted: as soon as you call anything a SIZ, you must immediately give it social status and, of course, money. The most serious work is being done in the republic to unify related activities under one SIZ.

[Question] How is it that the SIZ's have become ossified bureaucratic bodies?

[Answer] Ever since the self-managing communities of interest were organized in 1974 we have been concerned mainly with their organizational aspect: how delegations were to be elected to their assemblies, how many delegations, and so on, and less concerned with the essential matters (free exchange of labor and income-sharing relations). Second, when in that same year, 1974, we made a model of the SIZ, we wanted to cram into it, as on Procrustes' bed, every form of self-managing special-interest organization. Thus in practice the SIZ's grew to become strong institutionalized organisms. But that was not Kardelj's thinking about them. He regarded them as flexible self-managing organisms in which OUR's [organization of associated labor] could come together with other OUR's and even enter into direct discussion and agreement on the rendering and use of services.

[Question] Is it true that there has been hardly any of that in practice?

[Answer] In practice the assemblies of the SIZ's, which are not yet an expression of operation on the basis of delegacy, have been dominant. It is in them that agreements are to be achieved, rather than for decisions to be made in the name of associated labor. And then the assemblies of the SIZ's ought to be smaller bodies and not representative bodies consisting of 100 delegates or more.

[Question] The special-interest communities, then, have become alienated from associated labor?

[Answer] Yes, an inversion has taken place: the SIZ's have tended more to take on the elements of government agencies instead of self-managing those government agencies. The logic whereby the social services operate regardless of the income earned in material production has not yet been overcome.

[Question] How does the workingman look on all this?

[Answer] The workingman still does not see any functional link between what he is setting aside for health care and education and what he is getting. We are still talking about gratis medical treatment and education, but all this is paid for, and the price is high. The workingman still does not feel that he can exert the kind of influence whereby he gets better services for larger appropriations. If the truth be known, he often does not even come into contact with those rendering the services. Thus in most cases both are dissatisfied.

[Question] How is one to explain this?

[Answer] By the inherited system of budget financing, which was carried over to the system for financing institutions even in the framework of the SIZ's. There have been no qualitative changes at all. Whatever was previously received as funding from the budget is by and large received even now from the contributions, plus that guaranteed 20 percent under the resolution for this year.

[Question] What is the relationship between the executive officers and bodies of the SIZ's and the administrative agencies of sociopolitical communities?

[Answer] One can speak both about dualism and also about a tie-up of these entities. The bodies of sociopolitical communities determine by law the size of the needs for social services, and the bodies of the SIZ's are supposed to meet those needs, although they do not participate in passing the law. One can also speak about a tie-up between the executive officers and agencies of sociopolitical communities and the organs of the SIZ's, and that tie-up, by the nature of the thing, is very dangerous.

[Question] What are all the things which should be borne in mind when the SIZ's are criticized?

[Answer] Aside from criticism being sound and serious, it should also be objective and realistic. That is, it must be recognized that the area for free exchange of labor is restricted: three-fourths of the OUR's do not even plan their own personnel, much less the needs for education and culture. And then we have not worked out criteria and scales for evaluating labor in the social services. Finally, delegate relations are underdeveloped, and there is administrative interventionism and a deliberate resistance on the part of certain structures toward special-interest organization.

[Question] Finally, are there also certain constructive processes taking place in special-interest organization?

[Answer] Certainly there are. At one time we criticized the surpluses in the treasuries of the SIZ's. At the beginning of this year we abolished the rates of the contributions of all republic special-interest communities in the social services except for pensions and sciences. These communities now obtain their funds through association, and what has happened? Instead of the surpluses, the republic self-managing communities of interest now have deficits. Some of the opstina special-interest communities are beginning to put their hands on the funds that are supposed to go to the region and the republic.

[Question] Let us end with the question we began with: Why has there been from time to time such an outcry about the SIZ's?

[Answer] For all the shortcomings and problems of the SIZ's, it seems that we have become just a bit too nervous about their not performing their function, but have we as a society provided all the conditions for them to function? Neither the SAWP, nor the trade union, nor the League of Communists has ever become truly involved in the battle for special-interest organization either in associated labor or in the local community. And back in 1974 it was stated that the SIZ is the touchstone and keystone of our system.

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